Abstract
Rambouillet:
A Critical Reassessment
A critical assessment of the Rambouillet agreement suggests that the manner in which NATO intends to impose peace in Kosovo may be seriously structurally flawed. There are a number of legal, conceptual, and structural paradoxes inherent in the agreement that serve to obscure rather than clarify the potential for peace in the region.
Rambouillet has left the legal status of Kosovo veiled in ambiguity. It is still an integral component of the FRY and Serbia, yet neither entity has any legal jurisdiction there. Kosovo leaders still continue to anticipate and work toward independence, an option strictly prohibited by the framework offered by Rambouillet. There is, inherent in this legal ambiguity, a central operational problem: it serves as a foundation for the possible continuation of conflict when and if a declaration of independence occurs, and it provides a framework for indefinite occupation by KFOR (either to enforce Yugoslav integrity or to guarantee independence).
Theoretically, Rambouillet engenders another important ambiguity. The agreement has accorded structural legitimacy to political nationalism while simultaneously attempting to advance integration, reconciliation, and liberal democracy among and between ethnic/national groups in Kosovo. The province is now faced with a confusing political paradox. Nationalism has been sanctioned in a de jure manner and, at the same time, plural liberal democracy (in essence non-ethnic or national) is ostensibly being promoted. Collective (i.e., national or ethnic) interests face conceptual dilemmas when utilizing liberal democratic structures as a means to secure legitimacy.
In its imposition of peace, Rambouillet has marginalized the interests and aims of local actors. The agreement explicitly prevents any future agreement between the conflicting parties from taking precedence over Rambouillet. This has negative implications for the legitimacy of the peace operation, and problematically suggests that local actors are unqualified or otherwise too backward to effect peaceful solutions to their own conflicts.
Rambouillet calls for the immediate privatization of property and other government-held assets, and seeks to implement liberal democratic structures as quickly as possible in Kosovo. Yet a variety of emerging literature on peacebuilding indicates that such rapid transitions ignore the inherently destabilizing effects of democratic and free market competition on post-conflict societies. When social and institutional upheaval are the result of recent violence, it may be more important to stabilize economies and focus on integrating and legitimating politics rather than encouraging fierce liberal democratic competition.
Although perhaps unavoidable in the short-term, Rambouillet has contributed to the ongoing militarization of Kosovo by replacing one arbiter of legitimate violence (VJ) with another (KFOR). While the peacekeeping force is clearly not engaged in the same activity as have MUP and the Yugoslav Army, there are a number of new insecurities that are created by the presence of KFOR, and indeed apply to any large military deployment. Consider the recent reports of enforced prostitution designed to accommodate KFOR soldiers. There are also numerous allegations of peacekeepers¹ misconduct with regard to local populations, the most highly publicized of which was the arrest of a U.S. soldier in connection with the murder of 11-year-old Merite Shabiu. Other allegations include the physical ill treatment of Kosovar men, and various degrees of sexual misconduct and assault against Kosovar women and children. Even if we concede that these incidents are isolated (although many critical theorists will argue that brutality against women and children is integral to militarization), structural insecurities can lead to local rejection of KFOR and create new grounds for conflict.
In short, then, a critical reassessment of the underlying assumptions surrounding the potential of Rambouillet to secure and maintain peace must be undertaken in order to highlight the spaces where the ambiguity of the agreement and its implementation precludes other options. By exposing the structural flaws of the agreement, it is hoped that new spaces for discourse can be opened and genuine peace can be achieved through compromise and negotiation.
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