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Europe '93 - View from Prague
by Jiri Dienstbier

A speech held by Jiri Dienstbier, former foreign secretary of the CSFR, at a journalist-meeting in Berlin.
Translation by Zsuzsa Joerres and Philipp von Klitzing

Ladies and Gentlemen,
should I be asked the question how Europe looks to me from Prague I am tempted to remind you that I come form the city of
Joseph K. and the brave soldier Svejk.To me doing so appears to be appropriate again.
One might smile at this, but in December 1989 or during the year of 1990 I did surely not have such associations. That time
had been a time of euphoria and of enthusiasm about the fall of communism and the Berlin wall, a time of dreams about new
democracies and joining the unified Europe together with the reunited Germany. Jaroslav Hasek and Franz Kafka, however,
weren't carriers of euphoria; they were witnesses of a reality whose complicated relations were difficult to understand.
And exactly such a period of time we have entered. There is no point in asking whether this is good or bad.
In the post communistic world there has been very little success up to now, if one doesn't regard the decline of communism
itself as a success. But this already belongs to the past. Of course we were happy about it at that time. Surely, because
we thought the fall to be indispensable but we did not dare to believe in ever living to see it, not to speak of such a
quick and definite fall.
In east and west we all underestimated the extent of rottenness in our system. To overcome the system there was neither a
need for an external force nor the power of the internal opposition. Doubtless these forces existed and without them
nothing would have happened. But they entered the final fight when the system had already ladled out its own substance and
collapsed. The Berlin wall went down only after the Hungarian minister had opened the border to Austria. The inability in
preventing this was the last proof of the communist superpower's total exhaustion itself. Janaevs putsch in August 1991
remained but a ridiculous comma in the shadow of the formerly so famous power of Stalin.
Communism didn't fall in a duel with the better combatant and in full possession of its strength. It fell for it had
exhausted not just its political, economical and psychological sources but also its society. The most significant
differences among the communistic countries are not results of a course of development but of the situation the countries
were in when communism seized on them. The Czech Republic is better off than most of the other countries since it possessed
65% of the Austrian-Hungarian industry before World War I, while already one hundred years ago less than 2% of the citizens
were found to be illiterates. During that time - as well as between the wars - not only Bohemian beer, but also tiles from
Rakovnik, steel, machines and Skoda-automobiles travelled throughout the world.
In the work of our great-grandfathers and grandfathers lies our relative success of the present. Under great difficulties
we now try to adopt to their capabilities. We still have to go a long way in order to be as proud as they were once of a
work well done. The cultural and democratic traditions contributed in a positive way to the division of Czechoslovakia,
itself a failure, as there was not a single moment in which we were tempted to solve the problem by violent means. As all
of us know, the situation in other countries is worse. Despite that there are significant differences among them, too.
Altogether one can say that nobody was prepared, not for the end of communism and not for the extent of devastation its
ruin left behind. You in Berlin also only realised after bitter experience that the price for an economical and mental
reunification will be much higher than anyone ever expected after the fall of the wall and during the euphoria about the
suddenly fulfilled dreams.
In Western Europe, too, the decline of communism led to consequences no one had ever thought of. In Italy, for example, I
was told about the connection to the present political crisis. But I see a basic danger in the fact that the West tends to
think he has won the cold war. This might have consequences. The Atlantic Alliance and the European integration represented
an important support in the fight against communism by holding up a mirror to it and hindering all attempts to increase its
power behind the iron curtain. That way it was seen in this part of the world, too. For this reason the people respected
the foreign as well as the domestic policy of your countries.
But now we see this psychology changed by the fall of communism. The difficulties in Maastricht are a consequence of the
end of bipolarity. The people suddenly wish to pay more attention to their own affairs, often at the expenses of the
international holding-together of the democratic countries. They are much less prepared to tolerate the necessary
compromises of their governments. And they don't understand that the east needs as much as attention as in the past.
The iron curtain has not just been a prison wall for those who lived east of it. At the same this barrier of barbed wire
and nuclear warheads protected the democratic world from communism. And it was even more. The concrete hood clapped on
communism kept the real problems in this part of the world from being solved. Those problems on which the West had worked
for half a century lay quick-frozen on this side, waiting to emerge immediately in its full size after sudden defrosting.
And this ice had already contained highly corrupted pieces at the very beginning. Today it is evident to see how the iron
curtain protected the west from the results of a blow up as we experience it today with bated breath. For this reason many
yearn for the simply bipolarity of the world in which stability would be guaranteed on the expenses of the eastern half of
the continent.
Fortunately for us east of Elbe and Sumava this balance cannot be reobtained. On the other hand it doesn't mean that we
were to let things run freely and not find for a new equilibrium. Sometimes I hear talk about denationalisation of security
policy, the return of the times before the Versailles Treaty, before World War I or even the battle at Mohacs. [...]
Recently, during a visit in Scandinavia the question of Königsberg (Kaliningrad) arose. One speaks of the extent of
American units leaving Europe, GATT in Uruguay has come to a halt. A large question mark pose Russia and the Ukraine
concerning their position in the European system. Throughout the post communistic world numerous latent ethnic conflicts
exist close to break out. The war in Yugoslavia is not just a tragedy for the local peoples and a demonstration of the
world community's impotence, but a dangerous growth which - without proper surgery - could spread out easily.
Yugoslavia represents the typical example for which neither our thinking of crushing the Jalta system nor our international
organisations were prepared. A hypothetical decomposition had already been spoken of during Tito's lifetime. The question
sounded like this: What will be after Tito? But until the break down of the bipolar world nothing was possible. When the
slumbering disease finally found its way the world approached it by stiffened means. Day by day the screens told of
horrible crimes against children and whole cities, and when the demonstrators took to the streets the politicians lost
patience. Right at the beginning I warned that the Balkan, or the Yugoslav problem must be solved homogeneously. Yet the
winner was the salami-tactics.
In futile attempts I and others well acquainted with the subject matter like Lawrence Eagleburger tried to make clear that
an untimely recognition of Croatia would result in an explosion in Bosnia Hercegovina if there was no pressure put on the
remaining Yugoslavia by the international community. And, should there be a change on the Balkan or parts of it, bringing
in the Islamic world would rise the danger of a great Lebanon. Should the later not take place then we must be prepared to
take the Vietnamese risk in order to prevent former Yugoslavia to turn into a second Lebanon. But if we act consequently
then there will be hope for a way out that excludes both other options as mentioned above. This will be impossible without
homogeneous decisive action of the world community and the determination to make use of all opportunities in the worst
case.
In order to counteract future crises we have to look into the priorities of today's world and learn to understand them. The
modern world, symbolised by the computer, is based on two apparently contradictory tendencies: On the one hand the longing
for greater integration and universality, on the other hand the drive for more individuality and authority of the
individual. This contradiction is just ostensible since true universality can only be build by independent individuals that
are freed of a believe of a particular placed over idea. It has no meaning whatsoever, whether that particular idea leans
onto a religion, a nation, a wish to expand ones territory or an ideology of any kind. This doesn't go along with
uniformity.
Our perspective lies in the acceptance of our individual, personal, ethnic and religious differences and various opinions,
which are not to be understood as hurdles but as creative parts of European plurality. In a political or economical sense
it is of no interest whether we are German, Czech, Catholic or Protestant, Serb or Croat. Important is how we contribute to
the future development of human society. Our humankind is not abstract. We can serve our society only with our explicit
individuality, with our German-being, Czech-being, believe or non believe, with our opinion and our work that characterises
us.
Concerning the political area the question arises whether the European culture expands towards the east or whether the post
communistic crisis penetrates Western Europe in return. Refugees for example don't just represent a humanitarian problem.
Their arrival in West-German towns and villages changes structures lived for hundreds of years, they evoke a fear of
foreigners, racism, hatred of all kinds and hereby endanger the seemingly settled democracy. The danger was recently named
this way: Will the east be bruxellised or will the West be balkanised? This sentence puts it in the point: In my opinion
the entire strategy of European security depends on what extent the democratic zone and the potential prosperity are able
to spread.
If we recall how many horrible events have taken place in the Soviet Union, where besides communism the last of the
colonial empires fell apart, then I come to the conclusion that the present unstable conditions are in truth better than
one could expect. I am convinced that investing in a growing democracy is worth it as well as supporting the propositions
of its possible offspring wherever necessary. That includes the economy in particular, but also further development in
communication, telecommunication and education to put the people in the post communistic countries quickly onto their own
feet - not demoralising donations but offering hope to those who want to reach for it is required.
For the taxpayer this comes a thousand times cheaper than forty years of cold war. It is an impossible task to calculate
the costs for a defence against the consequences of a new downfall, which would not necessarily lead to communism, but at
least to one sort or the other of authoritarian dictatorship, not to speak of a new economical disaster of which the west
would protect itself by lowering a curtain once again. If we want to avoid new curtains and dangerous separations then it
must be the interest of the progressive countries to dedicate themselves to the arising problems with the same intensity as
formerly invested into the long and middle ranged missiles. We would save more than by the American retreat. And there
would not be any profit if one insisted for nostalgic reasons on the return of areas and possessions.[...]
Starting form the moment I was sworn into office I set my main goal in tying our country as quickly as possible to the
sphere of European culture to which it had belonged for thousands of years. I advocated the Pentagonale which linked in
1990 for the first time the NATO, the still existing Warsaw Pact and the neutral countries of middle and southern Europe.
The tragic events in Yugoslavia dimmed its activities. I supported the building of a middle European troika as a
stabilising factor and I hope the segregation of Czechoslovakia will not cause it to weaken but to give even more reason
for co-operation of the four. I brought myself in on building a system of co-operation between old and new institutions
including a certain partition of roles.
The charter of Paris towards a new Europe has been a success for all of us. Now it is to be materialised and pushed
forward. I believe that after some confusion the process of European integration, which represents the main force in the
overall European unification - not just in economic terms - will awake again. Possibly the citizens of the community of the
twelve don't realize their positive effect on conflicts in the post communistic world. I take the freedom to postulate the
thesis that besides other influences the desire for integration into the European society has led to a peaceful separation
of the former CSFR. No politician in these countries can allow himself to overstep certain borders and hence destroy the
perspective of taking part in the integration process.
The year of 1992 has been a year of superpessimism. Nevertheless I regard the saying "doomed to success by desperation" as
distorted. The consciousness of a necessity for success shows an awareness for responsibility. Clinton's victory in America
displays the need of the people to have a "new frontier". We in Europe are in necessity of it, too. Those huge territories
in Europe's centre and its east pose a great challenge for the European civilisation. For the first time in history Europe
has got the chance to unify not by expansionism and the demand for hegemony of a religion, a people or an ideology but in a
democracy to everyone's benefit. But: this is only a chance. A chance can only be made real through inventiveness, courage
and the will to take action. Europe never lacked any of these qualities. This is why I remain an optimist.